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ABSTRACT
Network slicing is a key capability provided to Fifth Generation (5G) mobile
network operators. The industry has defined many predefined network slice types that
depend on various key performance indicators (KPIs) such as bandwidth, throughput, and
latency. However, one missing component, in terms of KPIs for defining network slices,
is security, as there is currently no mechanism to translate network security or segmentation
of traffic into a 5G core network or Radio Access Network (RAN). Presented herein are
techniques to enable micro segmentation of a 5G network by using security as a KPI. The
techniques provided herein can be achieved by leveraging existing security capabilities and
algorithms to determine a reputation of endpoints and embedding the reputation within a
slice differentiator.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Network slicing is a key concept in the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
Fifth Generation (5G) System (5GS) architecture. A network slice is a logical end-to-end
network that can be dynamically created and may include any combination of 3GPP mobile
core network functions/functionality.
A user equipment may have access to multiple network slices over a Radio Access
Network (RAN). Each network slice may serve a particular service type with an agreed
upon Service-level Agreement (SLA). To provide mobile network services associated with
a given slice type, a slice of the given network slice type can be instantiated in which the
instantiated slice for the slice type can provide certain mobile network services to a number
of UEs.
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Per-3GPP Technical Specification (TS) 23.501, Section 5.15.2, Single-Network
Slice Selection Assistance Information (S-NSSAI) can be used to uniquely identify a slice
in which an S-NSSAI includes a Slice/Service Type (SST) indication, which indicates the
expected slice behavior for a slice requested by a UE in terms of expected features and
services, and, optionally, can include a Slice Differentiator (SD), which can be used to
differentiate among multiple slices of a same SST.
Different types of slices (slice types) can be configured for a mobile network such
that each slice type can provide certain mobile network services. Various example slice
types can include, but not be limited to, a cellular vehicle to everything (V2X) slice type
that can provide cellular V2X services, an Internet of Things (IoT or IOT) massive IoT
(mIoT) slice type that can provide IoT related services, an Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency
Communication (URLLC) slice type that can provide URLLC services, an enhanced
Mobile Broadband (eMBB) slice type that can provide mobile broadband services, a
massive Machine-Type Communication (mMTC) slice type that can provide MTC services,
a High Performance Machine-Type Communication (HMTC) slice type that can provide
HMTC services, etc.
Many predefined network slice types exist that depend on various key performance
indicators (KPIs) such as bandwidth, throughput, and latency. However, one missing piece
of current network slice definitions is security. Traditional network deployments (wireless
or wired) have shown the importance of baking in security into a network design. For
example, in terms of network segmentation, many solutions exist in traditional networks
such as virtual local area networks (VLANs), security or scalable group tags, etc. While all
of these technologies can continue to exist in the core parts of a network, there is currently
no such mechanism to translate this into part of the 5G network such as the RAN and Core.
Proposed herein is a novel technique for carrying security-related information
leveraging the network slicing framework available in 5G mobile networks.
Per 5G 3GPP standards, the role of determining the network slice for a particular
5G UE is that of a Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF) in which each unique network
slice is identified by an S-NSSAI field. As defined in the standards, this is a 32-bit field
allocated as:
•

8-bits for SST; and
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•

24-bits for the optional SD, which can be used by 5G mobile network
operators (MNOs) to differentiate between slices of the same type.

The SD plays a key role in the techniques proposed herein, as shown below in
Figure 1, which illustrates an example architecture through which techniques of this
proposal may be implemented. Although a single UE is illustrated in Figure 1, it is to be
understood that any number of UEs can be connected to a 5G network.

Figure 1: Example 5G Network Architecture
With reference to Figure 1, depending on the Policies defined and the NSSF, each
of a given UE can be placed into its own unique network slice type using a unique value
of SST (e.g., 1 for eMBB, 2 for URLLC, 3 for mMTC, 4 for enterprise 1 slice, etc.). During
operation, each of these unique slice types will have a large number of UEs connected to
them.
For example, consider for Figure 1 that two UEs, UE1 and UE2, are connected to
an enterprise slice and they both are mobile handsets of users. At this stage, the registration
process has been completed and the two UEs have the ability to connect to the access
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network. In the access network, there is likely to be a combination of various data security
functions/services (DSFn, in Figure 1), which could encompass be firewalls, intrusion
prevention systems, anomaly detection functions, malware protection services, email
filtering, etc.
Data from the UEs would be inspected by a multitude of DSFs, using algorithms as
currently known in the art, and insights provided by the DSFs could culminate in a decision
regarding a security reputation/score of a particular endpoint. It is to be understood that
techniques described herein are not limited to any particular method/algorithm for
computing/determining a security score/reputation, but rather can leverage any static, user
defined/configured, and/or dynamic method of determining a security reputation.
Initially the UEs will have an unknown reputation score and could then be assigned
a different reputation score based on the analysis of their network traffic pattern. For
example, after a certain time, UE1 could be given a high score (implying there is no
evidence of malicious network traffic patterns) and UE2 could be given a low score
(implying that there has been evidence of certain malicious traffic, e.g., UE2 has
downloaded a known malware file or has accessed websites that carry a poor reputation
score).
In accordance with techniques herein, this information can be communicated to a
Security Function (SECF), which is part of the 5G core. In some instances, this role could
be played by an existing centralized security management solution or an integrated solution.
A key function of the SECF is to be able to consume a change in the security reputation of
one or more UEs and translate change to a security score that can be embedded in the SD
part of the S-NSSAI.
For example, as illustrated in Figure 2, below, an "isolation" field can be configured
within the SD field of the S-NSSAI and can be used to indicate whether to place a particular
UE in a quarantined network slice. Further, a "security profile" field can be used to provide
a representation of the reputation of the particular UE, computed and communicated based
on the insights provided by the DSFs. Additionally, a "reason" filed can be used to carry a
reason why the particular UE has been given a particular security score.
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Figure 2: Slice Differentiator Configured to Carry Security Information
In accordance with the techniques proposed herein, the SECF can be configured by
a network administrator/operator with policies to map different security reputations to
specific values for the corresponding fields of an SD, as illustrated above in Figure 2.
During operation, the SECF can obtain this information for the SD and
communicates it to the NSSF so that a given UE can now be differentiated into its own
unique network slice within the SST in which it was placed into originally. In some
instances, there could be policies defined in a Policy Control Function (PCF) that trigger
application of policies for a given UE based on the information in the SD. For example, if
the "isolation" field is set for a particular UE, the UE could be forced to re-register and be
placed to a quarantine part of the 5G network including the RAN, Core, etc. so as to not
affect other UEs in the same network. Similarly, the other fields could be used for further
micro-segmentation of the 5G network based on the embedded security information in the
SD.
Further, the availability of a security KPI as part of the SD can be used by other
parts and functions in a 5G network in order to make decisions as to the Quality of Service
(QoS) provided to users in order to enforce bandwidth, throughput, security policies, etc.
Still further, the information in the SD can be translated to other forms of microsegmentation within the access network, such as through the use of trusted security group
tags and/or the like.
Reputation scores can be determined/updated continuously over time. For example,
as traffic is obtained from users, the DSFs will continue to inspect and analyze the traffic
in order to provide additional insights. The insights from the DSFs can continue to be used
to compute the overall reputation of UEs based on existing algorithms and communicated
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to the SECF. The policies in the SECF will be continuously evaluated and actions taken if
there is a change in the reputation and the policy mandates the need to modify the SD for
a particular UE. As an SD is changed due to changes in the security profile of a given UE,
changes in the S-NSSAI configuration may also be needed at multiple places in the 5G
core network (e.g., PCF, NSSF, etc.) in order to ensure consistent application of policies
across different users. As an alternative to updating SDs as reputation scores change over
time, in some instances a single SD could be defined into which users could be quarantined
if their reputation score fell below a threshold, which could help to alleviate potential
configuration changes for S-NSSAIs throughout a network.
Accordingly, techniques presented herein provide a novel method for embedding
security as a KPI within a 5G network using the SD field of the SNSSAI. This information
can be used by various functions to enforce policies when it comes to throughput, security
policies to enforce, isolation, etc. By providing such features, techniques herein may enable
further micro-segmentation of users for different elements of 5G networks. Moreover, the
embedded security information as part of the SD can be used by various 5G functions for
various policy applications that provide an overall quality of service for end users.
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